In the chapter “The End of the Book and the
Beginning of Writing” from his book Of Grammatology, Derrida looks at
writing in terms of language and boundaries. While the written word, such as the text of a book, is
printed and limited, it is still made up of language, meaning that it truly has
no boundaries. He also looks at
writing in relation to the spoken word, saying, “As has been more or less
implicitly determined, the essence of the phoné would be immediately proximate to that
which within ‘thought’ as logos relates to ‘meaning,’ produces it, receives it,
speaks it, ‘composes’ it” (11); speech signifies the speaker’s immediate
thought, and writing signifies that speech (“the voice, producer of the first symbols, has a
relationship of essential and immediate proximity with the mind” [11]).
I am reminded of Derrida’s “Signature Event
Context” in the sense that the concept of iterability is applicable here. To iterate
is to “perform or utter repeatedly,” However, this does not mean immutable iteration.
When one iterates, nothing exactly repeats and something will
change. Precisely because a sign,
such as a written or spoken word, is recognizable and repeatable, it will
mutate in the course of repetition; nothing means the exact same thing twice,
and on top of that, nothing means the exact same thing twice. If this is true, then speech may rank
higher than writing in that there is less distance between the original thought
and the iteration, whereas a written word is just that much more disjoined from
its origin.
However, Derrida comments on
how these modes of communication are changing, both in use and in
hierarchy. He notes that we have
used the word/sign “language” to mean “action, movement, thought, reflection,
consciousness, unconsciousness, experience, affectivity, etc” (9), which all
very clearly relate to the spoken word and its immediacy. However, when we say “writing,” we
refer to “language” and “all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether
it is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the
order of the voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also
pictorial, musical, sculptural ‘writing’” (9). Essentially, writing is the
totality of the experience of communication, a concept that can be observed in
action right now, as you are reading my blog post for class rather than
listening to a short oral presentation, or when you choose to send a text
rather than call the person directly, and even when I tutor someone via chat
box rather in a one-on-one session.
I believe that yet another reason we privilege
writing over speech is, if I may return to the idea, because of its
iterability. Let me try to explain…
When a sign is iterated or
repeated, another instance of that sign comes into existence. What is at stake here is the
seriousness of an utterance or a piece of writing, as it is the case that some
utterances (or arguments or readings), among all the disseminations, seem to us
more acceptable and satisfactory than others. There are, claims Derrida, endless interpretations of any
sign: “Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written…can be cited, put
between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and
engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion” (“SEC”
320). Putting words in quotation
marks shifts emphasis onto the words themselves and away from their “intended
meaning.” With an endless possibility
for dissemination from both the intention of the speaker and original context,
it becomes a chore to consider every interpretation and its value or
adequacy. But as long as we don’t
claim that adequacy is always determined by how “in line” an interpretation is
with the speaker’s intentions, then we have to explain, each time we are
presented with a new context, why we find one inference more cogent and
satisfying than another. This
process of interpretation and explanation of the seriousness of an utterance is
never complete, yet I believe Derrida sees this as the valuable aspect of
writing and speech. He definitely
proves in his essay that because of iterability, the concepts around writing
are indefinable but legitimate. If
signs carried the exact same meaning each time they were iterated, they would
be less valuable as their ability to “communicate” would be extremely
limited. It is precisely the
“drifting” (to use Derrida’s word) of writing that allows it to be interpreted
out of context; the sign does not need intention to signify, signified meaning,
or even a referent.
Language always allows for
iterability, but the spoken word is limited to its very context. Writing, on the other hand, can
transcend time and place, making it far more iterable than any other form of
language. What I say in class is
then and there, and while there are 11 different possibilities for the
interpretation of what I say at that moment, this blog post is available to
those same 11 people, as well as everyone else on the Internet, at any point in
time. With that said, it may be
that the “seriousness” of a dissemination is dependent upon both the
non-contextual reading the and the context, or “event,” of
that particular utterance. Yes, a
readable argument that can be deciphered independently of context is available
to a patient and diligent reader, but contexts can be
taken into account to help yield different readings that otherwise would have
been unavailable. Iterability
allows the basic condition of possibility without which there would be no
speech or writing at all, and this is why a plethora of interpretations is an
indwelling side effect of reading a written text.
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